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Abstract
Human social strategies have evolved as an adaption to behave in complex
societies. In such societies, humans intensively tend to cooperate with their
closer friends, because they have to distribute their limited resources through
cooperation (e.g. time, food, etc.). It also makes the situation difficult to
have uniform social relationships (social grooming) with all friends. Thus, the
social relationship strengths often show a much skewed distribution (a power
law distribution). Here we aim to show adaptivity of such social grooming
strategies in order to explore the evolution of human social intelligence. We
use a model in the framework of evolutionary games where the social grooming
strategies evolve via building social relationships with cooperators. Simulation
results demonstrate four evolutionary trends. One of the trends is similar to
the strategy that humans use. We find that these trends depend on three
parameters; individuals’ richness, group sizes, and the amount of social grooming.
The human-like strategy evolves in large poor groups. Moreover, the increase
of the amount of social grooming makes the group size larger. Conversely, this
implies that the same strategy evolves when the amount of social grooming is
properly adjusted even if the group sizes are different. Our results are important
in the sense that, between human and non-human primates, the differences of
the group size and the amount of social grooming are significant.
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1 Introduction
Cooperation is common among humans and it is fundamental to our society [12,
41]. The amount of cooperation by other people is limited because they have to
pay costs (e.g., money, time, opportunities, food, etc.) [38, 48]. Therefore, people
carefully choose their friends in order to receive intensive cooperation [34, 14, 47].
Actually, people tend to cooperate with close friends. An experimental study
using the Donation Game shows that participants tend to cooperate more with
closer friends [16]. Another study using the Public Goods Game shows that
friend groups are more cooperative with each other than with other groups [15].
Additionally, in a data analysis study dealing with the data set of a social
network game, people’s frequent communication increases their cooperative
behavior [45, 44].
Thus, it is important that humans have stronger social relationships in greater
numbers with cooperators than with others. We define social grooming as the
behaviour that constructs social relationships. Primarily, social grooming is
the act of cleaning or maintaining the body of a social partner in primates [8,
6, 27]. Social bonding is part of the functional aspect of social grooming.
Therefore, human social bonding behavior is also called social grooming [8, 6],
as a hypothetical extrapolation of the findings in non-human animals.
The behavior constructing social relationships is not limited to humans but
widely observed in primates [23, 22, 8, 6, 27, 45, 44, 43]. In doing so, they
face cognitive constraints [9] (e.g. memory and processing capacity) and time
constraints (i.e. time costs) in constructing and maintaining social relationships.
These time constraints are not negligible, as people spend a fifth of their day
in social grooming [5] for maintaining the relationship [18, 37]. Therefore, the
strength of existing social relationships exhibits a negative correlation with the
total number of social relationships [36, 26].
On the other hand, it is important to select cooperative partners in the
evolution of cooperation because cooperators tend to be exploited by defectors [3].
Moreover, direct reciprocity, spatial reciprocity, and network reciprocity, which
are the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, suggest the necessity of fixed
relationships [32, 31]. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that humans and
other social animals tend to cooperate with their close partners [16, 15, 45, 44].
Humans must construct and maintain social relationships within the con-
straints of this trade-off. We expect that strategies are employed to distribute the
limited time resources to maximize benefits from their social relationships [4, 25,
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39]. As a result of such strategies, social relationship strengths, as measured by
frequency of social grooming [37, 1, 42, 2, 13, 39, 43], may often show a skewed
distribution [50, 2] (distributions following a power law [42, 30, 1, 13, 19, 20, 43]).
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that social structures of non-human pri-
mates [11, 21, 46, 24] are also skewed.
The skewed distributions of the relationships could be generated by a strategy
where individuals select social grooming partners in proportion to the strength
of their social relationships [30, 43]; known as the Yule–Simon process [49, 40,
28]. Individuals should pay time costs to win the competitions with others by
strengthening their social relationships with cooperators, assuming that having
strong social relationships is to receive cooperation.
Human societies using these strategies are much larger than those of non-
human primates. Based on the social brain hypothesis, human intelligence has
evolved to adapt to large societies. Therefore, the evolution of human strategies
of social relationship construction may explain the origin of human intelligence.
However, evolutionary stability of the strategies, i.e. the Yule–Simon process, is
still open investigation.
In this paper, we aim to show the adaptivity of the social grooming strategies
in order to explore the evolution of human social intelligence predicted by the
social brain hypothesis. Especially, we focus on how environments drive the
evolution of a social grooming strategy that humans use in their daily life.
The evolution should depend on group size and the amount of resources for
cooperation. For this purpose, we simulate the evolution of the strategy to receive
cooperation from others with different environmental conditions for cooperations.
We show that strategies evolve depending on the strength of social relationships.
2 Methods
We expand the model of [43] to an evolutionary game. They consider two types
of individuals; social groomers and cooperative groomees (Fig. 1) [43]. In the real
world, individuals are groomers and groomees, simultaneously. For simplicity,
they use this classification to focus on the social grooming strategies for social
structures. In this paper, we focus on the evolution of social grooming strategies.
While the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation are well known [29, 32, 35, 31],
there are few study on the evolutionary dynamics of social grooming. Groomers
construct their social relationships with groomees depending on their social
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grooming strategies in a “grooming stage.” Cooperative groomees cooperate
with groomers depending on social relationship strengths in a “cooperation
stage.” Groomer strategies evolve based on their fitness which is the amount of
cooperation from groomees in each generation. Groomees’ cooperation strategies
are static.
In a grooming stage, groomer i repeatedly interacts with cooperative groomees
Rg times depending on their social grooming strategy (si, qi). qi is a ratio that
i constructs a new social relationship with a stranger, new groomee j, and si
is a parameter of a probabilistic function p(dij ; si) which selects existing social
grooming partner j depending on dij (dij > 0). We used the following function
(Fig. 2) as a simple function to express various strategies depending on dij
including concentrated investment to strong relationships (s = 4), diversified
investment to weak relationships (s = −4), at random (s = 0), and the Yule–
Simon process (s = 1; i.e. human-like strategy).
p(dij ; si) = b(dij ;αi, βi)/
M∑
k=1
b(dik;αi, βi), (1)
where αi = 1+si, βi = 1 when si ≥ 0 while αi = 1, βi = 1−si when si < 0. dij is
wij/max({wi1, wi2, . . . , wiM}), where wij shows strength of social relationships,
i.e., the number of social grooming from i to j. This function only depends on dij ,
because previous studies have revealed that people select their social grooming
partners depending on the strength of social relationships [30, 43]. Therefore,
this function can simply represent human-like social grooming strategies. M is
the number of groomees. b(x;α, β) is a normalized beta distribution xα−1(1−
x)β−1/B(α, β), where B(·, ·) is a beta function.
In a cooperation stage, groomee j cooperates with groomers in the top Rc as
ranked by {w1j , w2j , . . . , wNj}. The total payoff (i.e. fitness) of each groomer
is the number of cooperation (i.e. the number of times ranked in the top Rc
of each cooperator). That is, cooperators cooperate in their close relationships
according to their resources Rc. RcM shows all resources in the environment
(Rc,M), i.e. the total amount of cooperation.
The next generation is generated by sampling with replacement in proportion
to the groomers’ fitness, i.e. the roulette wheel selection. In each generation,
s mutates by the Gaussian distribution (µ = 0, σ = 0.2) and q mutates by the
Gaussian distribution (µ = 0, σ = 0.05), where µ is a mean and σ is a standard
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deviation of the distribution, where q ∈ [0, 1] (if q is out of range by mutation,
then it is set to the nearest value in 0 or 1). Groomers’ s and q in an initial
generation are set by the Gaussian distribution (µ = 0, σ = 5.0) and by uniform
distribution [0, 1], respectively. Cooperators do not evolve.
We conducted evolutionary simulations 30 times on each Rc and M by using
this model (Rc ∈ {5, 10, . . . , 50}, M ∈ {5, 10, . . . 200}). The number of groomers
N is 100, the number of social grooming actions Rg in each grooming stage is
300 (we also use Rg = 100 in experiments), and the number of generation T is 200.
The source code is available at “https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5526850.v1”.
3 Results
We found four evolutionary trends in the results of the simulations (Fig. 3). These
trends are explained by total resources RcM and the ratios of each cooperator’s
resources to the number of cooperators Rc/M (Fig. 4, 5).
Groomers evolved to trend 1 when RcM was small. Their s evolved larger
and their q evolved smaller. This strategy concentrates investment into strong
social relationships (e.g. s = 4 in Fig. 2). Groomers tended to evolve to trend 4
when RcM was large with s < 0 . This strategy widely invests in many weak
social relationships (e.g. s = −4 in Fig. 2). These trends’ s do not converge,
meaning that they do not have characteristic values.
On the other hand, s converged to 0 < s < 2 in trends 2 and 3. Trends
2 and 3 evolved in the intermediate range between trend 1 and 4, and Rc/M
determined whether groomers evolved to trend 2 or 3. Groomers evolved to
trend 2 when Rc/M was large, where q evolved larger. They evolved to trend 3
when Rc/M was small, where q evolved smaller. s in trend 2 tends to be larger
than s in trend 3. Both strategies are diversified investments (e.g. s = 1 and
s = 0.5 in Fig. 2), where groomers intensively invest in strong social relationships
while also widely investing in weak social relationships. Additionally, M , where
groomers evolved to trends 2 and 3 is larger, when Rg is large (see Fig. 4).
Next, we demonstrate how the four trends emerged throughout the evolution
and how groomers constructed social structures in each trend. Regarding the
former, Fig. 6, 7 shows the evolutionary pressures of each combination of s and
q, and the typical orbits of evolution. For the latter, Fig. 8, 9 shows strategies
of social grooming (a-d) and social structures of each trend, i.e. distributions of
w (e-h).
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Trend 1 evolved in environments with small RcM . Groomers are in intense
competition for receiving cooperation from groomees in the environments. There-
fore, they evolved to concentrate investments to a few poor groomees, i.e. large s
and small q ((Rc,M) = (5, 5) in Figs 6 and 8a). The results show that they only
had very strong social relationships in environments with small RcM (Fig. 8e).
Trend 4 evolved in environments with large RcM . Groomers easily receive
cooperation from groomees in these environments. Thus, they constructed many
weak social relationships with many rich cooperators ((Rc,M) = (50, 200) in
Fig. 6 and Figs 8d and 8h)
Trends 2 and 3 evolved between trend 1 and trend 4. Their s converge to
(0, 2), this means groomers with these strategies intensively invest in strong
social relationships while they also widely invest in weak social relationships
((Rc,M) = (15, 45) and (5, 200) in Fig. 6). Their social grooming probability
is in proportion to each strength of the social relationships (Figs 8b and 8c),
so their construction processes of social relationships are similar to the Yule–
Simon process. As a result, their social structures were similar to power law
distributions (Figs 8f and 8g).
The main difference between trends 2 and 3 is how q is affected by Rc/M .
When Rc/M is small, groomers have to confine the number of social relationships
with groomees to construct strong social relationships, because they compete
intensively in each social relationship (i.e. small Rc). Therefore, they evolved to
small q with small Rc/M (trend 3; (Rc,M) = (5, 200) in Fig. 6). In contrast,
when Rc/M is large, they do not have to restrict the number of social relationships
with groomees, because their competition is not intense in each social relationship
(i.e. large Rc) and the maximum number of their social relationships is small
(i.e. small M). Thus, they evolved to large q with large Rc/M (trend 2;
(Rc,M) = (15, 45) in Fig. 6). Interestingly, these trends of evolution show
non-continuous transition (see Fig. 10).
4 Discussion
We analyzed the evolutionary dynamics of social grooming strategies and social
structures. As a result, we find that the evolutionary dynamics depend on total
resources (i.e. RcM) and the ratios of each cooperator’s resources to the number
of cooperators (i.e. Rc/M). In the poor small groups, individuals’ strategies
evolved to concentrate investment among strong social relationships. In the
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rich large groups, their strategies evolved to wide investment among many weak
social relationships. In the middle groups, their strategies evolved according
to the Yule–Simon process. These strategies invest intensively in strong social
relationships while also investing widely in weak social relationships. As a result
of these strategies, skewed distributions of social relationship strengths were
generated.
There are two trend strategies which are similar to the Yule–Simon process [30,
43]. One evolved in relatively rich and small groups in the middle groups.
Individuals with this strategy constructed social relationships with all group
members, and reinforced their relationships in proportion to the strength of
social relationships. The other one evolved in relatively poor and large groups in
the middle groups. Individuals with this strategy constructed social relationships
with parts of their groups, and reinforced their relationships. In primitive human
groups, individuals belong to large groups and interact in small cliques within
them [11]. Hence, humans’ social grooming strategy may have evolved in the
latter group. Non-human primates may also have similar strategies, because they
also construct skewed social structures even though their group sizes are different
from humans [21, 11, 46, 24]. Their strategies’ similarity may be explained by
the difference of the amount of social grooming Rg. Our experiments show the
increase in the amount of social grooming Rg results in the increase of group
sizes M , in which social grooming strategies evolve according to the Yule–Simon
process (see Fig. 4). The same social grooming strategies are stable in different
group sizes. Actually, there is a positive correlation between group sizes and the
amount of social grooming in primates [7, 10].
If a social grooming strategy based on the Yule–Simon process is universal in
primates not limited to humans, and group sizes depend on external factors (e.g.,
predators, food, etc.), then social grooming strategies of humans and non-human
primates evolved to the same strategies by automatically adjusting their amount
of social grooming. This relationship between group sizes and strategies may
be clearly demonstrated by comparison among humans, non-human primates,
and other social animals. This will contribute towards an explanation of the
evolution of humans’ large social groups.
It is also important how cooperators select other cooperators as their interac-
tion partners [17]. For example, if cooperators maintain relationships with other
cooperators and break relationships with exploiters, their reciprocal relationships
will be maintained and their inegalitarian relationships will be broken [32, 31].
This mechanism to keep cooperation is known as network reciprocity. Social
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grooming strategies are network construction strategies. Actually, social groom-
ing has a beneficial effect on the construction of reciprocal relationships [45, 44].
Our results suggest that the evolution of human-like strategies for network
construction depends on the resources of environments and their group size. In
this paper, we focused on the evolutionary dynamics of social grooming with
stable cooperative behavior. The co-evolutionary dynamics of both behaviors is
an issue to be addressed in the future.
Comparison among various species’ data sets will be needed in order to clear
the relationships between environments and the four evolutionary scenarios of
social grooming strategies.
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Figure 1: Concept of our model. Social groomers interact with cooperative
groomees depending on their social grooming strategies. Cooperative groomees
cooperate with social groomers who are top Rc on the strengths of social
relationships. Groomer strategies evolve based on their fitness which is the
amount of cooperation from groomees.
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Figure 2: Examples of social grooming strategies. Social groomers with large s
tend to interact with a groomee in a strong social relationship (large d). On the
other hand, groomers with small s tend to interact with a groomee in a weak
social relationship (small d). When s = 0, groomers interaction is independent
from d. When s = 1, groomers interact in proportion to the strength of social
relationships, i.e. the Yule–Simon process.
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Figure 3: Summary of results of evolutionary simulations. We found four
evolutionary trends (s and q of the final populations) depending on total resources
RcM and the ratio of each cooperator’s resources to the number of cooperators
Rc/M (see details Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Fig. a shows the results of evolution with
parameter Rc and M . Each color shows the most frequent trend in parameters
of the point. This was created based on Fig. 4b. Fig. b is the concept diagram.
Trend 1 evolved when RcM was small. Trend 4 evolved when RcM was large.
Trends 2 and 3 evolved in the intermediate range between trends 1 and 4 where
Rc/M determined whether groomers evolved to trend 2 or 3. The behavior of
trends 2 and 3 were similar to human strategies, although trend 2 was closer, as
described.
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Figure 4: Frequencies of evolution in each trend. Trend 1 evolved when RcM
was small. Trend 4 evolved when RcM was large. Trends 2 and 3 evolved in the
intermediate range between trends 1 and 4 where Rc/M determined whether
groomers evolved to trend 2 or 3. Additionally, Rg increased a range of group
sizes M in which social grooming strategies evolved to trend 2 or 3, i.e., a large
amount of social grooming evolved to trends 2 and 3 in large groups.
Figure 5: The results of evolutionary simulations in Rg = 100, 300. Figures b
and d are extended from Figures a and c. q increased with RcM . This trend in
Rg = 100 was more significant than Rg = 300.
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Figure 6: Average selection pressures (ds, dq) in four trends for (s, q) and typical
orbits from (s, q) = (0, 0.5). These figures show trends 1, 2, 3, and 4 from left.
The cell colors show the gradients of s and q (i.e. ds, dq). For example, the
figures show s and q decrease when (s, q) is in a cell of ds < 0 and dq < 0. Areas,
where the cell colors are mixed, show little gradients, that is, mutation noises
were larger than selection pressures. For example, populations were random
walk along the s axis and they were small along the q axis, when s < −1 in
Rc = 5 and M = 200. Evolutionary pressures were calculated using the method
of the average gradient of selection (AGoS) [33]. That is, we calculated the
mean difference of s and q of the next generation of a population in which
individuals’ s and q obeyed the Gaussian distribution ((µ = s, σ = 0.2) and
(µ = q, σ = 0.2)) on each cell (s, q). If the distribution generated a value outside
of the range [0, 1] then that was set to the nearest value in the range. These
orbits were drawn based on the average selection pressures and noises which is a
normal distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 0.01. Incidentally, there is no cell in
(ds, dq) = (0, 0). Evolutionary dynamics in Rg = 100 showed similar trends (see
Fig. 7).
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Figure 7: Average selection pressures (ds, dq) for four trends for (s, q) and typical
orbits from (s, q) = (0, 0.5). These figures show trends 1, 2, 3, and 4 from left.
Evolutionary dynamics in Rg = 300 showed similar trends (Fig. 6).
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Figure 8: Strategies of social grooming (a-d), i.e., probability p of social grooming
after each strength of social relationship w, and social structures of each trend
(e-h), i.e. distribution of w in each trend. These figures show trend 1, 2, 3, and
4 from left. These trends in Rg = 100 are similar to them (see S3 Fig). In the
Figures a-d, the orange points are the 25th percentile, the green points are the
50th percentile and the blue points are the 75th percentile. In the Figures a-d,
we drew w when the number of samples was more than 20. The figures of trend
2 and 3 of the Figures f and g are shown by using a logarithmic scale in both
axes. In the social structure of trend 1 (e), many weak relationships were caused
by mutation noises of q.
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Figure 9: Strategies of social grooming (a-d), i.e., probability p of social grooming
after each strength of social relationship w, and social structures of each trend
(e-h), i.e. distribution of w in each trend. These trends in Rg = 300 are
similar to them (see Fig. 6). In the Figures a-d, the orange points are the 25th
percentile, the green points are the 50th percentile and the blue points are the
75th percentile. In the Figures a-d, we drew w when the number of samples was
more than 20. The figures of trend 2 and 3 of the Figures f and g are shown
by using a logarithmic scale in both axes. In the social structure of trend 1 (e),
many weak relationships were caused by mutation noises of q.
Figure 10: Evolution of q in trends 2 and 3 as log(Rc/M). These figures show a
non-continuous transition between them.
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